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Over the past twenty years, Americans have turned their backs on one
of the New Deal's most important legacies by deregulating nearly every
market to which regulation has been applied. At one time the markets for
interstate trucking and air transport were subject to strict cost-of-service
ratemaking and government controls on new entry. Now, however, both
trucking' and air tickets2 are priced by the market, the same way as potatoes
or lumber, and anyone who can obtain access to the necessary facilities can
enter. The telecommunications system was once a regulated monopoly from
top to bottom, with price regulation applying to everything from long
t Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa College of
Law.
1. See Motor Carrier Act of 1980,49 U.S.C. §§ 10706(b)(3)3)-(D) (1994).
2. See Civil Aeronautics Board Sunset Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-443, 98 Stat. 1703
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.); Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.
L. No. 95-504, §§ 28, 30, 92 Stat. 1729, 1731 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49
U.S.C.); MELVIN A. BRENNER ET AL., AIRLINE DEREGULATION (1985); STEPHEN BREYER,
REGULATION AND ITs REFoRM 197-204 (1982).
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distance service to the mandatory rental rate of a telephone instrument.3
Now long distance rates are set through competition by numerous firms, the
instruments are purchased off the shelf from any of a number of retailers,
and significant competition for local telephone service appears imminent.4
Wholesale transfers of natural gas and electric power have also become
substantially competitive, and the market for the delivery of retail
electricity to residences may soon become competitive as well.'
This deregulation has produced tremendous gains for the United States
economy. Prices for most deregulated services have dropped significantly.
Following deregulation, the rate of innovation has increased substantially,
with telecommunications providing only the most visible example. And, of
course, we have saved many of the costs of operating the regulatory system
itself-a set of pure transaction costs, or deadweight loss. Society is
probably better off as a result.6
But while society as a whole may be better off, deregulation has
undoubtedly diminished the welfare of the once-regulated firms. On the one
hand, at least some of these firms have seen the removal of various
regulatory restraints that prevented them from expanding into other
markets. On the other hand, the rigors of competition have produced lower
rates of return, greater risks, and occasionally the premature retirement of
assets.
The main concern of Sidak and Spulber's provocative Deregulatory
Takings and the Regulatory Contract' is the state's duty to compensate
regulated firms that encounter these losses. The authors give most of their
attention to the problem of "stranded" costs: investments in specialized,
durable assets that may have seemed necessary, or at least justifiable, when
3. On the history of telecommunications regulation, see MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL.,
FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 23-39 (1992); and JOHN R. MEYER ET AL., THE
ECONOMICS OF COMPETITION IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 1-68 (1980).
4. The culminating deregulatory provision is the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). See generally
PETER W. HUBER ET AL., THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996 (1996) (analyzing the effects
of the Act on the telephone, broadcast television, and cable television industries).
5. See David S. Copeland, Requiring Transmission Access by Electric Utilities: The Shifting
Roles of Regulation and Antitrust, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 291 (1996); Lee A. Rau, Open Access in
the Power Industry: Competition, Cooperation and Policy Dilemmas, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 279
(1996); Michael 0. Wise, Overview: Deregulation and Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry,
64 ANTITRUST L.J. 267 (1996).
6. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 396 (5th ed. 1998) (summarizing
the costs of regulation). For helpful accounts of the opinions and the literature on this subject, see
Thomas 0. McGarity, The Expanded Debate over the Future of the Regulatory State, 63 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1463 (1996); and William B. Tye & Frank C. Graves, The Economics of Negative
Barriers to Entry: How To Recover Stranded Costs and Achieve Competition on Equal Terms in
the Electric Utility Industry, 37 NAT. RESOURCES J. 175 (1997), which discusses the social gains
resulting from the deregulation of the electric power industry.
7. J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE
REGULATORY CONTRACT: THE COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN
THE UNITED STATES (1997).
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constructed and placed into service under a regime of price and entry
controls but that have become underutilized or even useless under
deregulation.' The superfluous electric generation plant is a paradigmatic
example of this kind of asset.' In the former regime of tight wholesale and
retail regulation, utilities were typically regarded as being self-sufficient.
To a significant extent, they produced their own power for their own
customers. Furthermore, they needed to have a certain amount of excess
capacity to protect their customers against unusually high demand or a
temporary generation plant shutdown. But in the deregulated environment
three things are happening." First, utilities can freely purchase wholesale
electric power from elsewhere, thus giving an advantage to efficient
producers who have lower costs; further, the high degree of
interconnectivity necessitates fewer backup resources." Second, many
utilities have been required to purchase electricity from alternative low-cost
sources, thus forcing their own higher-cost sources to lie idle. Third, certain
"dedicated" equipment that was designed with a single producer and
distributor of power in mind is unsuitable in the modern environment of
free switching among numerous power sources.
The result is that, under deregulation, some of the plants and other
equipment in which the utilities made significant investments either can no
longer be operated profitably or cannot be operated at all. This problem is
exacerbated by extreme specialization. An electric generation plant that has
become unproductive as a result of mandatory power wheeling among
utilities cannot profitably be converted into another use. In the extreme case
of a completely useless plant, the owner may be able to obtain no more than
the facility's salvage value, which is typically only a tiny percentage of the
unrecovered investment. 12
To be sure, the nature and extent of the stranded cost phenomenon
varies greatly from industry to industry. For example, deregulation in the
airline industry has led to greatly increased demand for air travel.13 Not
only did the deregulated airlines not have to retire significant numbers of
8. See, e.g., id. at 8-9, 28-30,442-63.
9. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TRANSMISSION PRICING AND
STRANDED COSTS IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUsTRY 98-114 (1995) (discussing stranded costs
in the electric power industry); William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs, 18 HARv.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 835 (1995) (same).
10. See generally sources cited supra note 9.
11. For example, a New England utility facing unusually high air conditioner demand during
a summer heat wave may be able to purchase excess power from the Ohio Valley instead of
relying on its own extra capacity.
12. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 128 n.52.
13. See Elizabeth Brannen, The Problem of Aging Aircraft: Is Mandatory Retirement the
Answer?, 57 J. AIR L. & CoM. 425, 433-34 (1991) (explaining that deregulation has resulted in
increased demand for air travel); cf. STEVEN MORRISON & CLIFFORD WINSTON, THE ECONOMIC
EFFECTS OF AIRLINE DEREGULATION 1-2, 52 (1986) (finding that airline deregulation has resulted
in lower prices and greatly increased productivity).
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aircraft in response to deregulation, but the demand for aircraft has been so
great that the carriers have tended to fly airplanes far longer than their
manufacturers designed them to be flown. 4 Further, mobile assets such as
aircraft and trucks do not face the "stranded" cost problem to the same
extent as, say, electric generation plants. If an airplane or a truck becomes
superfluous in one market, it can readily be shifted to another.
The full costs of assets that are stranded by deregulation remains to be
determined. As the case of airline deregulation suggests, one anticipated
effect of deregulation is lower prices, which produce increased demand. To
the extent that deregulation increases demand, fewer assets are "stranded,"
and indeed, even older, less efficient plants may continue to find a use. So
deregulation of telecommunications and electric power will shift a great
deal of production toward more efficient producers, thus decreasing the
demand on less efficient producers. At the same time, deregulation may
increase total demand and leave a market even for higher cost producers.
Indeed, some recent power plant sales made after Sidak and Spulber's book
was published suggest that the problem of stranded costs in the electricity
industry is not nearly as great as was once thought. Power plants that had
been written off as stranded by deregulation are in fact finding strong
market demand. 5
Part II of this Book Review examines the notion of the "regulatory
contract," that is, a unique bargain between the sovereign and the regulated
firm. This presumed bargain provides the foundation for the Sidak/Spulber
claim that a deregulated utility is entitled to compensation for its stranded
costs. But the historical domain of the regulatory contract is not nearly as
broad as Sidak and Spulber argue, and even when such a contract exists, it
does not necessarily have the meaning that they assign to it. Further, while
the argument for compensation based on a regulatory contract might make
some sense when a regulated firm makes its investment in reliance on a
government promise of regulated monopoly status, a great deal of
regulation did not develop in that way. Rather, it was imposed ex post on
14. See Brannen, supra note 13, at 425, 433-34 (attributing the overuse of old aircraft to
increased demand brought about by deregulation).
15. See Power Plant Sales Raise Questions About Stranded Costs, Consumers' Bills,
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Daily (BNA) (Feb. 6, 1998), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNAATD File (noting that there were numerous recent sales of power plants and that all were
sold above book value, some significantly so); Massachusetts Generating Plants Sold at Six Times
Their Book Value, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Daily (BNA) (May 28, 1998), available in LFXIS,
BNA Library, BNAATD File. A related and problematic result, which Sidak and Spulber do not
discuss, is that states that have enacted compensation regimes end up overcompensating because
no actual stranded cost losses actually occur. This overcompensation, which goes only to utilities
already in place that have facilities subject to stranding, operates to give incumbent utilities a
significant cost advantage over new entrants, thus reducing market competitiveness. See Report
Warns New Market Power Could Kill Consumer Benefit of Electricity Reform, Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Daily (BNA) (June 25, 1998), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNAATD File.
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firms that had already made their investments and thus could not have
relied on any such governmental promise. 6
Part III then continues this argument by explaining that the case for
compensation is particularly weak when the private utility itself-often
acting with only nominal governmental supervision-made its regulatory
investments on its own initiative. This is indeed what occurred in a great
majority of regulated industries.
In Part IV, I assess the notion that changes in regulatory policy rather
than changes in technology are mainly responsible for the predicament in
which some regulated firms find themselves. No one compensates a firm
for technological obsolescence resulting from ordinary market forces. But
an essential premise of the Sidak/Spulber argument is that deregulation
policy rather than technological change has caused this obsolescence, and
since the government, unlike markets, is responsible for the destruction in
property values that it imposes, compensation must be paid. 7
Finally, Part V challenges the Sidak/Spulber notion that compensation
should be based on losses anticipated at the time competition is introduced,
rather than on ex post measurements of losses that actually occurred. The
method one chooses is of great importance, as anticipated losses have often
failed to materialize. Sidak and Spulber's endorsement of the former
method is inconsistent with the way damages are ordinarily measured in
takings cases, and there are persuasive reasons for not deviating in these
situations.
H. THE REGULATORY CONTRACT
Sidak and Spulber argue that public utilities that face "stranded" costs
as a consequence of the deregulation process generally should be
compensated for their losses. They point out that deregulation is a
government act, which in this case has "taken" the property of the
deregulated utilities, thus giving them a constitutional right to compensation
under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause."8
That deregulation is a government-initiated process is thus central to
the Sidak/Spulber argument. The market itself frequently makes older
facilities obsolete or unprofitable, yet one who invests in soon-to-be-
outmoded technology is not entitled to compensation. For example, if I
have the misfortune to invest in a slide rule production plant that opens just
days before a breakthrough allows scientific calculators to be produced
cheaply for the mass market, no one will compensate me for my
16. See infra Section l.B.
17. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 213-272.
18. See id. at 216-55.
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improvident investment. Indeed, the competitive market is filled with the
abandoned facilities and other debris that rivals' innovations have made
obsolete. 9
Further, as a general matter, forcing firms to bear the costs of
obsolescence is wise policy because doing so encourages efficient risk-
taking. If an entrepreneur contemplating a new investment knew it was
entitled to compensation from the government if the investment did not pay
off, then it would make the investment with little regard to the prospects of
market success. Indeed, if there were full compensation, then any prospect
of success would justify the investment, for the investor's downside
exposure would be zero. But if the investor must bear the full cost of its
own losses, then it will collect all cost-justified information pertaining to
the prospects for success and balance the risk and costs of failure against
the prospects and anticipated magnitude of success. In sum, the market
tends to reward prudent investments by refusing to provide compensation
for the "stranded" costs of facilifies that new technology or changes in
consumer preferences have made obsolete. Compensation for improvident
investments would yield overinvestment.
For this reason, Sidak and Spulber's argument for compensation cannot
succeed unless they can show that the investment made by a regulated firm
rests on a fundamentally different footing than the investment made by an
ordinary enterprise. The main difference that Sidak and Spulber believe
they have found is that a "regulatory contract" exists between the
government and the regulated firm, but not between the government and the
unregulated firm. In its simplest terms, this regulatory contract is an
agreement with the state that requires the utility to invest its resources in
some expansion of its enterprise, such as a new power generation plant. In
return, the state guarantees a rate of return that is significantly lower than
the higher end of returns encountered in competitive markets, but also
promises to remove the risk of improvident investment. As a result, the
risk-adjusted rate of return is presumably about the same.2"
If such a contract exists, deregulation and the resulting obsolescence of
stranded facilities require compensation to the utilities, as the government
would be reneging on its side of the regulatory bargain. In that case, Sidak
and Spulber believe that the Takings Clause of the Constitution requires the
government to compensate the utility by putting it in the same position in
19. For example, see Michael T. Maloney et al., On Stranded Cost Recovery in the
Deregulation of the U.S. Electric Power Industry, 37 NAT. RESOuRCES J. 59-60 (1997), which
notes the extent to Which obsolete microwave towers had to be destroyed by long distance carriers
when advances in fiberoptic technology rendered them obsolete. Maloney also notes that the firms
did not seek compensation, even though they were regulated, at least to the extent that they were
required to file tariffs with the FCC. See id.
20. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 101-68.
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which it would have been had the regulatory contract been performed.2"
This explains the use of the term "deregulatory taking" in their title. Just
like regulatory takings, "deregulatory" takings arise when the government
acts for the benefit of nearly everyone but unfairly or inefficiently places
the burden on a small group of property owners.
Thus, as Sidak and Spulber freely admit, the regulated firm's
entitlement to compensation for obsolescence hinges on the existence of
this regulatory bargain with the government.22 That bargain provides the
basis for the reasonable, investment-backed expectations of someone who
decides to invest in regulated rather than competitive markets. These
expectations in turn justify applying the Takings Clause when the bargain is
broken.
A. Historical Development and Domain
Sidak and Spulber speak of the regulatory contract in these terms:
The regulated utility submits to various regulatory restrictions
including price regulations, quality-of-service requirements, and
common carrier regulations. In return, the regulated firm receives a
protected franchise in its service territory, and its investors are
allowed an opportunity to earn revenues subject to a rate-of-return
constraint. Without the expectation of earning a competitive rate of
return, investors would not be willing to commit funds for
establishing and operating the utility.... Once the utility invests
those funds, the long depreciation schedules typical in electricity
and telecommunications regulation credibly commit the utility to
performing its obligations under the regulatory contract by denying
it the opportunity to recover its capital before the end of its useful
life.
23
But Sidak and Spulber also admit that the files of the regulated firms
and the government's regulatory agencies contain no explicit "regulatory
contracts" guaranteeing compensation for stranded investments in
exchange for the utilities' willingness to invest in the regulated enterprise.
They concede that the regulatory contract, if it exists, is like the English
Constitution." It does not exist on any single piece of paper, but rather is "abundle of public utility statutes, utility commission precedents, adjudicatory
21. See id. at 273-81.
22. See id. at 450.
23. Id. at 109.
24. See id.
1999]
The Yale Law Journal
decisions, rulemakings, hearings on the record, formal notices of proposed
rulemaking, and public commentary."'
The existence of any such contract imposing an obligation of
compensation upon governments is controversial. Some scholars make the
important argument that no compensation is due because there is no
regulatory contract at all-indeed, that the entire concept of a regulatory
contract is a relatively recent invention, developed at the behest of the
utilities themselves to justify compensation awards that a competitive firm
could never expect for its own improvident investments.26
Sidak and Spulber counter by arguing that the regulatory contract in the
United States is in fact quite old and dates back to the very first Supreme
Court decision involving a rate-regulated "natural monopoly" utility-the
Charles River Bridge case of 1837.27 Sidak and Spulber also note that Irston
Barnes' influential treatise on public utility regulation, which was published
in 1942, cited an "implied-contract" theory, whose justification Barnes
found in the utility's franchise from the government.28 Sidak and Spulber
then argue that the importance of the Charles River Bridge decision lies in
the "common understanding throughout it that the relationship between the
state and the private [regulated] firm was contractual in nature." 9
But Sidak and Spulber's account of Charles River Bridge and
subsequent regulatory decisions seriously misrepresents the nature of
nineteenth-century public utility regulation and, in the process, creates a
false analogy between regulation then and regulation now. Further, the
authors ignore the most important principle established in Charles River
Bridge, one that the Supreme Court has reiterated time and time again:
When one bargains with the state, nothing passes by implication, and all
promises are to be narrowly construed."0 This principle dramatically
25. Id. at 109-10. For this argument, Sidak and Spulber rely upon United States Trust Co. v.
New Jersey:
[A] statute is itself treated as a contract when the language and circumstances evince a
legislative intent to create private rights of a contractual nature enforceable against the
State. In addition, statutes governing the interpretation and enforcement of contracts
may be regarded as forming part of the obligation of contracts made under their
aegis.") (citations omitted).
431 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1977); see SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 110.
26. Suggesting that such contracts do not exist are 1 MICHAEL T. MALONEY & ROBERT E.
MCCORMICK wrTH RAYMOND D. SAUER, CUSTOMER CHOICE, CUSTOMER VALUE: AN
ANALYSIS OF RETAIL COMPETITION IN AMERICA'S ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 6 (1996); Robert J.
Michaels, Stranded Investment Surcharges: Inequitable and Inefficient, PUB. UTIL. FORT., May
15, 1995, at 21; and William Niskanen, A Case Against Both Stranded Cost Recovery and
Mandatory Access, 1996 REGULATION 16.
27. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 134 (discussing Proprietors of Charles River
Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837)).
28. See id. at 133 (discussing IRSTON R. BARNES, THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC UTILITY
REGULATION 14-15 (1942)).
29. Id. at 134.
30. See infra notes 41-65 and accompanying text.
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undermines the claim that utilities generally enjoy the benefits of a
regulatory contract protecting them from stranded costs.
The fact that the Charles River Bridge case involved a regulatory
contract with the government is beyond dispute. Indeed, the relationship
between the state and the regulated firm in that decision was contractual in
nature because the regulatory scheme itself consisted of a contract between
the state and the shareholders of the Charles River Bridge corporation. This
approach to regulation was very common in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. The state would typically strike a highly
individualized deal with the regulated firm and enshrine that deal in the
firm's corporate charter.31 Previously, in the Dartmouth College case, the
Supreme Court had established that a corporate charter was a contract
between the chartering state and the chartered corporation, and thus it fell
under the constitutional provision forbidding the state from impairing an
obligation of contract.32
This mechanism of regulation by contract contrasted sharply with the
statutory regulation that developed after the Civil War and was upheld in
Munn v. Illinois.33 In Munn, price regulation was applied after the fact to a
firm that was already in existence and doing business, and the Court's
decision rested on the premise that the state had always been empowered to
set such prices. In Charles River Bridge, however, there was no statute of
general application that regulated bridge tolls. Rather, the regulatory
provisions were spelled out in the bridge company's own corporate charter,
or contract with the state.34
31. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERIcAN LAW 1836-1937, at 125-30
(1991).
32. See Darmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819). Almost a decade
earlier, the Supreme Court had decided in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-38 (1810),
that a land grant from the state was also a "contract" for Contract Clause purposes.
33. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
34. The Charles River Bridge corporate charter, which had been issued in 1785, made the
following provision for rates:
Each foot passenger (or one person passing), two-thirds of a penny; one person and
horse, two pence two-thirds of a penny; single horse cart or sled, or sley, four pence;
wheelbarrows, hand-carts, and other vehicles capable of carrying like weight, one
penny, one-third of a penny; single horse and chaise, or sulkey, eight pence; coaches,
chariots, phaetons and curricles, one shilling each; all other wheel carriages or sleds
drawn by more than one beast, six pence; meat cattle and horses passing the said
bridge, exclusive of those rode or in carriages or teams, one penny, one-third of a
penny; swine and sheep, four pence for each dozen, and at the same rate for a greater or
less number, and in all cases the same toll shall be paid for all carriages and vehicles
passing the said bridge, whether the same be loaded or not loaded; and to each team
one man and no more shall be allowed as a driver to pass free from payment of toll, and
in all cases double toll shall be paid on the Lord's day; and at all times when the toll
gatherer shall not attend his duty the gate or gates shall be left open.
STANLEY KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES RIVER BRIDGE
CASE 10 (1971) (quoting the language of the charter). For another general discussion of the case,
see HOvENKAMiP, supra note 31, at 110-14. For a discussion of the company's rights under the
charter, see generally Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 344 (1829).
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Most significantly, however, the corporate charter did not contain a
provision granting the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge a monopoly
or specifying a distance upstream or downstream in which no competing
bridge could be built. Nor did it contain a provision promising
compensation if the bridge should become unprofitable. During the first
half of the nineteenth century, numerous such charters were negotiated with
various railroad, bridge, and turnpike companies, each with their own
unique provisions. 5 Some of these charters stipulated that the right to take
toll should last only until the shareholders had recovered their invested
costs plus a specified return, typically nine to twelve percent per annum.
3 6
At that point the bridge, turnpike, or other public facility would revert to
state ownership. The Charles River Bridge shareholders were particularly
fortunate that their charter did not contain such a provision, and they had
been able to continue collecting tolls even though the bridge had been paid
for many times over.37 Other bridge companies had received different deals.
For example, while other charters may have been of more limited duration,
they also may have contained explicit monopoly provisions that forbade the
construction of competing bridges within a specified distance, or for a
specified time period.3"
The Charles River Bridge dispute arose when, in response to popular
pressure, the Commonwealth chartered the Warren Bridge to operate a
short distance away and compete with the Charles River Bridge. The
Warren Bridge charter, unlike the Charles River Bridge charter, contained a
provision stating that once the investors had received a return of their
investment plus a reasonable profit, the bridge would become public and
free. Further, it would become free in six years whether or not the
proprietors received a reasonable return.39 The six-year limitation in the
Warren Bridge charter suggests how good a deal the proprietors of the
Charles River Bridge had been able to negotiate for themselves. Though the
bridge was originally chartered in 1785, by the time of litigation its
proprietors had been collecting tolls for nearly half a century.4"
35. These are recounted in HOVENKAMP, supra note 31, at 36-41, 125-30. See also MORTON
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, at 122-26, 135-38 (1978)
(discussing litigation involving these state-chartered monopolies).
36. See HORwrrZ, supra note 35, at 129-30; HOVENKAMP, supra note 31, at 111-12.
37. See HORwIz, supra note 35, at 130; KUILER, supra note 34, at 12-13.
38. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 31, at 112 n.13.
39. See Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 420, 427 (1837) (noting that under the terms of its charter, Warren Bridge was to be
"surrendered to the state, as soon as the expenses of the proprietors in building and supporting it
should be reimbursed," and in no event after six years).
40. The Warren Bridge had been chartered in 1828. See id. Furthermore, prior to the
construction of the Charles River Bridge the same proprietors had owned the franchise for a ferry
that had carried passengers from Boston to Cambridge in about the same place. See id. at 429-3 1.
On the extraordinary profitability of the Charles River Bridge before the Warren Bridge was
chartered, see KuTLER, supra note 34, at 12-13.
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The basis of the Charles River Bridge suit was that the charter given to
the Warren Bridge violated the Charles River Bridge charter because the
latter should have been interpreted to contain an implied monopoly
provision giving the Charles River Bridge perpetual protection from new
market entry. Thus, by granting the competing charter, the Commonwealth
had violated the Contract Clause.
But Chief Justice Taney held that the Court did not need to reach the
constitutional issue because the Contract Clause comes into play only when
the contract in question covers the claimed right. In this case, nothing in the
bridge contract gave the Charles River Bridge proprietors a monopoly right
or an entitlement to perpetual profits. The Court's most significant
regulatory conclusion can thus be summed up in Chief Justice Taney's
statement that "in grants by the public, nothing passes by implication."41
The proprietors of the Charles River Bridge had bargained with the state
and won many explicit and favorable contractual terms, including high tolls
and a lengthy franchise, but not a monopoly provision.
Following Charles River Bridge, both the Supreme Court and state
courts consistently enforced similar regulatory contracts according to their
literal terms. If the corporate charter contained a monopoly provision, the
courts recognized and enforced it.42 Further, if there was an express
monopoly provision and the state wanted to take it, compensation was
required.43 If the charter contained no monopoly provision, however, none
would be implied.'
41. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 546.
42. See, e.g., In re Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51, 82 (1865) (enforcing an explicit
monopoly provision in a corporate charter).
43. See, e.g., WVest River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507, 529-34 (1848) (holding
that a state must pay compensation when it uses its eminent domain power to take a previously
granted monopoly right from a bridge company). In Boston & Lowell Railroad v. Salem & Lowell
Railroad, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 1, 4 (1854), the railroad had been given a 30-year charter promising
that "no other railroad than the one hereby granted shall, within thirty years from and after the
passing of this act, be authorized to be made, leading from Boston... to Lowell." The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts permitted the state to charter a second railroad between the same
two points, but only if it compensated the plaintiff. See id. at 36. The Supreme Court also
confronted the issue of monopoly grants contained in rate regulatory charters in the Slaughter-
House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). The corporate charter given to the Crescent City
Company created a price-regulated public slaughterhouse in New Orleans, with the rates once
again stipulated in the charter itself. See id. at 42. Further, it gave the corporation a monopoly by
forbidding the commercial slaughtering of animals anywhere else in the city. See id. at 38. The
Supreme Court upheld the provision against a claim that the monopoly grant violated the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of butchers who lost their independent businesses
under the monopoly provision. See id. at 81. For more detailed discussions of the case, see
HOVENKAMP, supra note 31, at 116-24; and Mitchell Franklin, The Foundations and Meaning of
the Slaughterhouse Cases (pts. I & 2), 18 TUL. L. REv. 1, 218 (1943). See also CHARLES
FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUcTION AND REUNION: 1864-88, at 1321-27 (1971) (discussing the
background and import of the Slaughter-House Cases). The detailed rate regulations, which
included charges of ten cents per animal per day for pen storage, and slaughtering fees of one
dollar per head for cattle, fifty cents for hogs, and thirty cents for sheep, goats, and lambs, are
spelled out in the opinion. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 39, 42 (quoting the
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For Sidak and Spulber, the Charles River Bridge case is significant
primarily because the regulation at issue involved a contract45 It
unquestionably did, as did most regulation of that time. But while the
Charles River Bridge decision undoubtedly involved a regulatory
"contract," that case hardly stands for the proposition that all utilities-
including those subjected to statutory rather than charter-based regulation-
have such contracts. And it certainly does not stand for the proposition that
such a contract, including specific protections for stranded costs, can be
implied in the absence of an explicit right. Indeed, the holding is precisely
to the contrary.
Significantly, the Charles River Bridge case did not merely involve a
price-regulated public utility. It was also the Court's first "stranded cost"
decision-at least if one ignores the fact that by the time of litigation the
Charles River Bridge structure had probably been paid for many times. The
effect of introducing a free bridge a half mile away was to make the Charles
River Bridge superfluous, thereby giving the proprietors an almost useless
asset.
Nevertheless, the variety of regulatory contracts contemporaneous with
the one at issue in Charles River Bridge made the wisdom of that decision
crystal clear. Like anyone else bargaining with the state, the proprietors of
the Charles River Bridge Company made the best deal they could get. In
this case they had succeeded in getting a long-term right to collect tolls that
provided for no diminution after the bridge's costs were fully amortized,
but they had not succeeded in getting a monopoly provision. The Warren
Bridge charter limiting tolls until payoff or for six years was much less
attractive. The Supreme Court wisely refused to interpret the Contract
Clause of the Constitution so as to give the Charles River Bridge's owners
more than they had obtained through their negotiations.
The next major decision that Sidak and Spulber consider is Munn v.
Illinois.46 The distinguishing feature of the price regulation at issue in Munn
is that it was not individually negotiated but rather was created in a
regulatory statute that applied to all firms operating in a designated
market.47 Furthermore, the firms had already been in operation before the
1869 charter of the Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House, §§ 3, 7); see also
HOvENKAMP, supra note 31, at 121 (observing that butchers in New Orleans had to pay prices set
in the Crescent City Charter in order to use the facility).
44. See, e.g., Turnpike Co. v. Maryland, 70 U.S. (3 Wal.) 210,213 (1865) (refusing to imply
a monopoly privilege in a turnpike charter that contained no explicit provision).
45. See SiDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 134-38.
46. 94 U.S. 113 (1877). See SIDAK & SPuLBER, supra note 7, at 138-40.
47. Munn described the statute at issue as
fix[ing] by law the maximum of charges for the storage of grain in warehouses at
Chicago and other places in the State having not less than one hundred thousand
inhabitants, in which grain is stored in bulk, and in which the grain of different owners
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price regulation provision was passed and had historically operated under
common law rules that placed no limit on their power to set their own
prices.
Sidak and Spulber misread Munn as implying the existence of a
regulatory contract-in this case by relying on Richard Epstein's
observation that Chief Justice Waite justified rate regulation in Munn by
noting "that traditional common carrier obligations imposed upon a party
receiving a legal monopoly the obligation to charge only reasonable fees for
the services rendered, where the restriction on the power to charge what one
sees fit is the quid pro quo for the monopoly in question."'t " That
interpretation might make some sense if Munn & Scott had been a common
carrier with a statutory monopoly or if it had a monopoly provision in its
corporate charter. But there was no such provision. The monopoly enjoyed
by Munn & Scott was entirely de facto, arising from its strategic location at
the intersection of railroad tracks that gave it a preferred position as
unloader and loader of grain from its silo to the open railroad cars below.
As a result, there was no quid pro quo at all."9
Indeed, in Munn, not only was there no "regulatory contract" contained
in a corporate charter, as in the Charles River Bridge case, but there was no
charter at all. Munn & Scott was a common-law partnership, created in a
market (grain elevators) where firms traditionally had not been
incorporated. In fact, as the Supreme Court made clear a few years later, it
selected Munn among the numerous price regulation cases before the Court
that term50 because Munn & Scott's lack of corporate status exposed the
is mixed together, or in which grain is stored in such a manner that the identity of
different lots or parcels cannot be accurately preserved.
Munn, 94 U.S. at 123.
48. SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 139 n.90 (quoting RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAiN 168 n.15 (1985)).
49. See Munn, 94 U.S. at 128 (describing the elevator's status as a "virtual monopoly"). In
his dissent, Justice Field noted, "The compensation which the owners of property, not having any
special rights or privileges from the government in connection with it, may demand for its use, or
for their own services in union with it, forms no element of consideration in prescribing
regulations for that purpose." Id. at 146 (Field, J., dissenting); see also id. at 136-37 (Field, J.,
dissenting) (declaring property rights to be protected by the Constitution from legislative
interference). Finally, Justice Field protested that in other cases involving rate regulation, the firm
in question had a legal monopoly, which served as a quid pro quo for the regulation in question.
See id. at 152 (Field, J., dissenting).
50. Collectively, the companion cases to Munn are referred to as the "Granger Cases"
because they originated in the Grange movement, which organized farmers in opposition to what
they perceived as unduly high rates charged by railroads, grain elevators, and related firms
providing transportation and storage services to midwestern grain growers. The other cases all
involved railroads that had corporate charters. In each case, the Supreme Court upheld statutory
price regulation, notwithstanding the fact that the railroads had pre-existing charters containing no
provision entitling the state to regulate rates. The cases were Chicago, Burlington, & Quincy
Railroad v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155 (1876); Peik v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway, 94 U.S. 164
(1876); Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Railroad v. Ackley, 94 U.S. 179 (1876); Winona & St.
Peter Railroad v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180 (1876); and Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181 (1876).
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heart of the dispute: whether the state had the power to regulate in the
absence of a regulatory contract:
[T]he case of Munn v. Illinois was selected by the court as the most
appropriate one in which to give its opinion on [the state's power to
"limit... tolls and charges"], because that case presented the
question of a private citizen, or unincorporated partnership,
engaged in the warehousing business in Chicago, free from any
claim of right or contract under an act of incorporation of any State
whatever."'
Thus, Munn in fact stands for the broad proposition that a firm that
began as a common investor in a presumably competitive market could
later be made subject to price regulation if it acquired a bottleneck, or
monopoly, status.
Sidak and Spulber's history of the regulatory contract subsequent to
Munn does no more than state the obvious. In this instance, the obvious was
already implicit in the Charles River Bridge decision: Where there was an
explicit contract between a franchised public utility and a government
entity, the Supreme Court enforced the contract according to its terms. But
this hardly establishes the existence of a regulatory contract in other cases
where no such explicit obligation exists-and it does nothing to upset Chief
Justice Taney's unambiguous pronouncement that "in grants by the public,
nothing passes by implication." 
52
The decisions that Sidak and Spulber cite for the proposition that a
"regulatory contract" generally exists with regulated firms in fact stand for
the quite different proposition that only particular regulated firms have such
contracts. When they do have them, the courts have interpreted their
explicit language literally but have not gone further. For example, the
Binghamton Bridge case, from which Sidak and Spulber quote at some
length, rests on the existence of "a contract, with mutual considerations,"
and "justice and good policy alike require that the protection of the law
should be assured to it." 
53
But the issue in Binghamton Bridge was hardly the existence of a
general "regulatory compact" to be collected from numerous sources and
Indeed, in the Stone case, the railroad operated under a corporate charter that permitted the
company to "demand and receive such sum or sums of money for passage and freight of persons
and property as they shall from time to time think reasonable." Stone, 94 U.S. at 181-82.
Notwithstanding what appeared to be an explicit contractual right allowing the railroad to set its
own rates, the Court permitted the state of Wisconsin to impose rate regulation by statute after the
fact. See id. at 182-83.
51. Wabash, St. Louis, &Pac. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557,569 (1886).
52. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (I1
Pet.) 420, 546 (1837); see supra text accompanying notes 27-45.
53. In re Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51, 74 (1865), quoted in SIDAK & SPULBER,
supra note 7, at 144-45.
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full of implied grants. Rather, it was an explicit provision in a corporate
charter. The Court described the charter in great detail, noting that it
stipulated where the bridge should be built, how it should be constructed,
where the toll gates should be located, and "the amount of tolls to be
taken. .. ." " Most importantly for the dispute at issue, the charter
provided: "It shall not be lawful for any person or persons to erect any
bridge, or establish any ferry across the said west and east branches of
Delaware River, within two miles either above or below the bridges to be
erected and maintained in pursuance of this act."55 The lawsuit then arose
when, a half century later, the legislature of New York authorized the
construction of a second bridge "within the prescribed limits" of the
monopoly grant given to the plaintiffs. 6 The Court agreed that the
authorization of this second bridge violated the first bridge's charter, and
thus that the charter given the second bridge violated the Contract Clause.
By the same token, the New Orleans Water Works decision,57 which
Sidak and Spulber also discuss at some length,5" involved the express
provisions of a franchise that gave the plaintiff the exclusive right for fifty
years to lay its water pipes and mains under the streets of New Orleans and
provide that city with water. The dispute arose when the city passed an
ordinance permitting a second company to begin supplying water long
before the plaintiff's exclusive right had expired. The Court once again
found impairment of an obligation of contract. Likewise, the Walla Walla5 9
case involved a municipal grant to a waterworks company to place "all
necessary water mains, pipes, connections, and fittings" under the city
streets and operate the city's water system, reserving to the city itself only
the right to place fire hydrants where it might see fit.6' The charter further
provided that "the city of Walla Walla shall not erect, maintain or become
interested in any water works except the ones herein referred to .... ,, 61 The
dispute arose when the city decided to go into the water business for itself
in express contravention of the charter, thus reducing demand for the
plaintiff's water system.
Finally, Russell v. Sebastian62 involved a state provision that permitted
a municipality to authorize a single gas company to provide the entire city
with gas. Acting in reliance on this provision, the plaintiff built a plant
54. In re Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall) at 52-53.
55. Id at 53.
56. Id. at72.
57. New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1885).
58. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 146-47.
59. Walla Walla City v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898), discussed in SIDAK &
SPULBER, supra note 7, at 147-49.
60. Walla Walla City, 172 U.S. at 4.
61. Id. at 5.
62. 233 U.S. 195 (1914), discussed in SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 149-53.
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capable of serving the entire city, including the numerous new streets that
were being constructed and annexed. However, Los Angeles later took the
position that the exclusive grant referred only to the then-existing streets
already served, and that it was free to charter one or more additional
companies to provide gas to the expansion areas. Once again, the challenge
came under the Contract Clause, and the Court held that the only reasonable
interpretation of the charter provision under which the gas company had
acted was that it would be entitled to serve the entire city, including
expansion areas. The Court, however, also reiterated the Charles River
Bridge conclusion that "public grants are to be construed strictly in favor of
the public" and that "ambiguities are to be resolved against the grantee."63
In explaining the rationale for narrow construction, the Court noted:
It has often been stated, as one of the reasons for the rule, that
statutes and ordinances embodying such grants are usually drawn
by interested parties and that it serves to frustrate efforts through
the skillful use of words to accomplish purposes which are not
apparent upon the face of the enactment.64
In this case, however, the Court found "no ambiguity" in the contract
language authorizing the utility to supply the entire city, including
expansion areas.65
In sum, none of these decisions do not bear the weight that Sidak and
Spulber attach to them. They hardly stand for the proposition that every
public utility enjoys the benefit of an unwritten "regulatory contract"
protecting its investment from subsequent government decisions making
that investment unprofitable. Rather, they stand for a proposition that is
much narrower (particularly when one considers the sophistication of
public utility managers): that public utility investors get from the state
precisely what they are able to bargain for, no more and no less.
Further, the idea that grants from the state must be explicit and
narrowly construed is hardly idiosyncratic or well camouflaged in the law
of regulated industries. To the contrary, it is so unmistakable that it must be
regarded as a part of the rational expectations of any knowledgeable public
utility investor. Literally dozens of times, throughout both the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries,' the Supreme Court has reiterated and consistently
adhered to the Charles River Bridge prescription that contracts with the
63. Russell, 233 U.S. at 205 (citing Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of
the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420,546,549 (1837)).
64. Russell, 233 U.S. at 205 (citing numerous decisions).
65. Id. at 206 ("There is no ambiguity as to the scope of the offer. It was not simply of a
privilege to maintain pipes actually laid, but to lay pipes ... so far as may be necessary for
introducing into and supplying such city and its inhabitants either with gaslight, or other
illuminating light, or with fresh water for domestic and all other purposes .... ").
66. Most recently in United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 874 (1996).
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government are to be strictly construed against the grantee. In fact, the
Court has often gone further, insisting that one cannot read "implications
and presumptions" into the state's promises,67 that regulatory promises
from the state are to be given the "narrowest rational reading," 6 and that
claimed provisions in agreements with the state be "clearly and
unequivocally expressed."'69 As the Supreme Court reiterated in a 1939
decision refusing to imply a monopoly:
The vice of the position is that neither their charters nor their local
franchises involve the grant of a monopoly or render competition
illegal. The franchise to exist as a corporation, and to function as a
public utility, in the absence of a specific charter contract on the
subject, creates no right to be free of competition, and affords the
corporation no legal cause of complaint by reason of the state's
subsequently authorizing another to enter and operate in the same
field. The local franchises, while having elements of property,
confer no contractual or property right to be free of competition
either from individuals, other public utility corporations, or the
state or municipality granting the franchise. The grantor may
preclude itself by contract from initiating or permitting such
competition, but no such contractual obligation is here asserted.7
The consistency, clarity, and frequency of these decisions completely
undermine any argument that public utility investors have a "settled
expectation" of compensation from injuries caused by the insertion of
competition into markets that were previously regulated monopolies. Quite
the contrary, the only expectation that can be regarded as "settled" is that
utility investors are entitled to what the government has explicitly and
unambiguously committed itself to and no more. In all probability, only a
67. National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry., 470 U.S. 451, 466
(1985) (citing Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 548, for the
proposition that one cannot construe an explicit regulatory contract broadly by using
"implications and presumptions").
68. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168, 173 (1947).
69. Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393, 396-97 (1944) ("Since the contract here relied upon is one
between a political subdivision of a state and private individuals, settled principles of construction
require that the obligation alleged to have been impaired be clearly and unequivocally
expressed.").
70. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 139 (1939) (citing numerous
decisions, including Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 548) (footnotes omitted);
see also United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229, 235 (1960) (stating that "all
federal grants are construed in favor of the Government lest they be enlarged to include more than
was expressly included" in finding that no compensation was due when a federal flood control
project rendered a state power plant worthless); Barcellos & Wolfsen, Inc. v. Westlands Water
Dist., 899 F.2d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 1990) (" [A]ny ambiguity in the contract must operate against
the adventurer and in favor of the public.") (citation omitted); Northwest Paper Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 344 F.2d 47, 51 (8th Cir. 1965) (holding that ambiguities in federal grants should
be "construed in favor of the government").
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tiny fraction of the firms facing deregulation today can claim to have a
"regulatory contract" that unambiguously entitles them to compensation
for the incursions of competition.
The Takings Clause jurisprudence on this issue is just as clear as the
Contract Clause jurisprudence. Even Justice Scalia, whose strong position
on takings makes him something of a hero in Sidak and Spulber's book,"
conceded in Lucas that a regulatory statute presumed to reduce the value of
the plaintiff's property to zero was nevertheless justified if the state's
historical legal traditions established that such an event could be said to be
a part of the landowner's reasonable expectations.72
B. Regulation Applied to Assets Already in Place
If the basis for statutory regulation were contractual, then regulation
would have to be applied in such a way as to create the appropriate
incentives for private investors. Ex ante, the state would induce the electric
utility to build a new power plant by promising monopoly status,73 a
71. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 172-73, 175-77, 198, 244-45, 456.
72. In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1030 (1992), the Court found
that "this recognition that the Takings Clause does not require compensation when an owner is
barred from putting land to a use that is proscribed by those 'existing rules or understandings' is
surely unexceptional." But when property is denied "all economically productive or beneficial
uses" that go "beyond what the relevant background principles would dictate," then
compensation must be paid. Id. The Court remanded for inquiry into whether state nuisance law or
other legal principles created a situation in which the land owner could reasonably have
anticipated the regulation in question. Id. at 1031-32; see also id. at 1016 n.7 ("The answer to this
difficult question may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped by the
State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's law has accorded legal
recognition and protection to the particular interest in land with respect to which the takings
claimant alleges a diminution in (or elimination of) value.").
In Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, 854 P.2d 449 (Or. 1993), the Oregon Supreme Court
concluded that the ancient common-law doctrine of "custom" was part of the law of Oregon, id.
at 456, and that dry-sand beachfront property "has been enjoyed by the general public as a
recreational adjunct of the wet-sand or foreshore area since 'the beginning of the state's political
history."' Id. at 453 (quoting State ex reL Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 673 (Or. 1969)). As a
result, a state law rule giving the public the right to enter privately owned beaches and providing
no compensation to the owners met the Lucas test because it was part of the settled expectations
of Oregon owners of beachfront property:
When plaintiffs took title to their land, they were on notice that exclusive use of the dry
sand areas was not a part of the "bundle of rights" that they acquired, because public
use of dry sand areas "is so notorious that notice of the custom on the part of persons
buying land along the shore must be presumed."
Id. at 456. Justice Scalia wrote a vigorous dissent from the denial of certiorari, concluding that the
federal courts, not the state courts, should have the right to determine whether a particular
regulatory intervention was well enough established in a state's legal tradition so as make its
assertion reasonably foreseeable. See Stevens, 510 U.S. at 1207-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari).
73. In natural monopoly regulation a promise of legal monopoly status may be necessary to
prevent alternative firms from "cream-skimming," or entering the market only to serve a subset
of low-cost or high-profit customers. See 2 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE EcONOMICS OF REGULATION:
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 221-46 (1971).
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guaranteed rate of return, or other mandated market conditions that would
operate to guarantee the investors a competitive return in exchange for their
willingness to give up the higher returns (and higher risks) that attend
investment in a competitively structured market. The tradeoff would thus be
reduced risk for the investor in exchange for reduced upside potential.
But beginning with Munn v. Illinois,74 the Supreme Court has generally
upheld rate regulation as applied to productive assets that were already in
place at the time the regulatory statute was passed and that had been built
on the assumption that they were being placed in unregulated markets."
Both Munn and the Supreme Court's later decision in Budd v. New York76
concluded that the government could take an ordinary competitive business
and subject it to price regulation, at least in circumstances where the
businesses had acquired a de facto monopoly status.77 Indeed, in the
Railroad Commission Cases, the Supreme Court even permitted price
regulation to be applied to previously unregulated railroads without
requiring any showing of monopoly status."
More recently, in Pennell v. City of San Jose,7 9 the Supreme Court went
even further. There, the Court set aside a takings challenge to a municipal
rent control ordinance that used some cost-based criteria for determining
maximum rents but also permitted the administrative decisionmaker to
consider "hardship to the tenant" as a factor justifying a further reduction
of rents."0 The reason for rejecting a takings challenge was that the hardship
factor had never been applied in a way that had forced a landlord's rent
74. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
75. The principal exception to the rule permitting after-the-fact regulation of assets already in
place is when the regulation forces private investors to accept rates so low that they are unable to
recoup historical costs plus a reasonable return on them. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944) (finding a reasonable return on historical investment
to be constitutionally adequate); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898) (finding that investors are
entitled to a reasonable return on the value of their property employed for the convenience of the
public).
76. 143 U.S. 517 (1892) (adhering to Munn and discussing numerous intervening decisions).
77. As the Supreme Court explained in Budd:
It is contended... that the business of the relators in handling grain was wholly
private, and not subject to regulation by law; and that they had received from the State
no charter, no privileges and no immunity, and stood before the law on a footing with
the laborers they employed to shovel grain, and were no more subject to regulation than
any other individual in the community. But these same facts existed in Munn v. Illinois.
In that case, the parties offending were private individuals, doing a private business,
without any privilege or monopoly granted to them by the state.
Id. at 545.
78. The leading Railroad Commission case, and the only one producing a full opinion, was
Stone v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 116 U.S. 307 (1886). The regulatory statute at issue was
passed in 1884 and applied to a railroad that had been incorporated in 1848 under a charter
permitting it to set its own rates. See id. at 308, 314, 316. Companion cases raising the same basic
issue were Stone v. Illinois Central Railroad, 116 U.S. 347 (1886), and Stone v. New Orleans &
Northeastern Railroad, 116 U.S. 352 (1886).
79. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
80. See id. at 4-6, 13-14.
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below the constitutional minimum level of reasonable return on historical
investment.81
In any event, Pennell is particularly relevant for two reasons. First,
residential rental property in San Jose was hardly a monopoly. There were
many competing landlords, although there were also regulatory constraints
on new construction that had created an imbalance between the supply and
the demand, thus permitting landlords to charge rents above their costs.
Furthermore, as the development of the case law from Munn to Budd to
Pennell makes clear, monopoly status is not essential to the government's
power to regulate without providing compensation for business losses. In
Munn and Budd, the apparent premise was that the prices of the monopolist
firms in question would not be constrained by competition. In Pennell, rent
control was presumably thought to be justified by temporary imbalances
between the demand for housing in San Jose and the rate of construction,
but the Supreme Court never required any showing at all that the market
was failing to drive prices to the competitive level.
Second, the rent control ordinance in question in Pennell, as is
frequently the case, applied to property that had been placed on the market
before the ordinance was passed and that presumably had been constructed
on the premise that the market would determine rental rates. Further,
nothing in the rent control ordinance created a quid pro quo-for example,
a guarantee that landlords would be entitled to compensation if their
apartments became obsolete or unprofitable for reasons unrelated to the size
of the legal maximum rent.
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist assumed that
"objectively reasonable" rent regulations would be permissible under the
Takings Clause, notwithstanding the lack of any regulatory contract
protecting the landlord's original investment from injuries caused by
competition. He noted that the ordinance permitted allowable rents to be
computed on the basis of a number of factors, six of which were objective
and related to the cost of services and a reasonable rate of return.82 The
factor that was being challenged, by contrast, related to the tenant's
"hardship" and theoretically might have permitted a regulator to award a
tenant a rental rate so low that the landlord would not receive a reasonable
rate of return. However, as Rehnquist explained, "there simply [was] no
evidence that the 'tenant hardship clause' [had] in fact ever been relied
upon by a hearing officer to reduce a rent below the figure it would have
been set at on the basis of the other factors set forth in the Ordinance."83
Beyond this, Rehnquist noted, there was no basis for a per se taking, for the
81. Seeid. atS-11.
82. See id. at 9 ("The first six of these factors are all objective, and are related either to the




Supreme Court had "consistently affirmed that States have broad power to
regulate housing conditions in general and the landlord-tenant relationship
in particular without paying compensation for all economic injuries that
such regulation entails." 4
In sum, if price regulation were a contract, we would expect the
Supreme Court to strike down cases in which the regulator imposes limits
on prices without giving the regulated firm anything in return, as in Munn,
the Railroad Commission Cases, and Pennell. But the Court has done no
such thing.
Il. ASSIGNING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ULTIMATELY IMPROVIDENT
REGULATORY INVESTMENTS
Compensation for stranded costs would therefore appear to be
constitutionally compelled in a much narrower range of circumstances than
Sidak and Spulber argue. The first compelling case arises when a regulatory
contract exists. But as just discussed, the case law makes clear that neither
the existence nor the coverage of such a contract can be implied from
ambiguous circumstances. 5 Such a contract requires clear, unmistakable
language from the sovereign promising to protect the utility's investment,
its monopoly status, its continued right to receive revenue from a specific
plant, or any other right that might be in dispute. Breach of the regulatory
contract justifies compensation only when the government has reneged on
an express and unambiguous contractual promise. This is the meaning of
the Charles River Bridge decision 6 and the numerous cases that have
followed it. 7 Because the law on this issue is clear, it must be considered to
be part of the investment-backed expectations of any utility investor.
Second, the case for compensation is strong even when no regulatory
contract exists but the government actually initiates an action compelling
the utility to construct a new facility and later changes regulatory policy in
such a way as to render the facility useless or unprofitable. Such an act
involves no calculated risk-taking at all by the utility, but rather merely
involves compliance with a government order. As such, it is equivalent to
the forcible transfer of valuable property from a private party to the state-
as when the state takes title or forces a price-regulated firm to accept rates
below its costs.
84. Id at 12 n.6 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419
(1982)). The Court also noted that "statutes regulating the economic relations of landlords and
tenants are not per se takings." Id. at 12 n.6 (quoting FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245,
252 (1987)).
85. See supra Part II.
86. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text.
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However, such situations must be regarded as the exception rather than
the rule, and they must be proven. In most cases, the instigator of expansion
is the regulated firm itself. The Sidak and Spulber theory of regulation and
stranded costs seems to assume a world in which government agencies
order public utilities to invest in new facilities "in the public interest," and
the utilities are then obliged to do so, accepting in return a governmental
guarantee of a reasonable profit for the useful life of their investment. In
this imagined enterprise, the government is the policy leader and the utility
a mere follower. Furthermore, the follower appears to have no choice but to
do what the government compels-always subject to the limitation that the
utility is entitled to the competitive rate of return on its overall investment.
Alternatively, they may contemplate a situation in which both regulators
and utilities are, equally well-informed, and the two engage in a joint
enterprise determining the optimal regulatory investment.
The truth is most often to the contrary."S Much more commonly, public
utility investments are made at the behest of the utilities themselves, with
agencies advocating limitation rather than expansion. Alternatively, they
are made under circumstances in which the utilities have access to better
information than the agencies and disclose this information selectively to
maximize their own profits. 9 In such cases, one can hardly conclude that
the investment was compelled by the state.
Of course, if a regulatory contract existed promising that the state
would protect every "reasonable" utility investment, then a duty to
compensate could be derived from the contract itself. But as implied above,
such contracts must be regarded as exceptional, and even when they do
exist they obligate the sovereign to do only what was explicitly promised.
In the absence of such a contract, a utility must either be taking its own
risks or else it must be following the orders of the sovereign. The duty to
compensate in the latter case then derives from the fact that the state has
taken from the private firm the ability to make its own assessment of
reasonable risk. When no regulatory contract promising protection of
investment exists, and when the utility effectively makes its own
investment decisions (whether or not they were "prudent" when made),
88. A few examples of exceptional cases are Ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall
245 U.S. 345, 351 (1917), which upheld a state order that required a utility to extend its facilities
over the utility's objection that the incremental revenues would not be sufficient to cover the
incremental costs of extension provided that the utility's overall return continued to meet the
constitutional minimum; Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U.S. 574,
582 (1917), which upheld a state commission order requiring a street railroad to extend its current
route; Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Railroad Commissioners, 216 U.S. 262, 284
(1910), which mandated that a railroad operate an additional route; and Atlantic Coastline
Railroad Co. v. North Carolina Corp. Commission, 206 U.S. 1, 21-27 (1907), which upheld a
state agency order requiring a railroad to add a route to a town that it had previously abandoned.
89. On this point, see Oliver E. Williamson, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract: Some Precautions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1007, 1013 (1996).
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then a compensation requirement would overcompensate, by paying off
risks that were already incorporated into the regulated returns.
Cost-of-service ratemaking can give regulated firms perverse incentives
to make inefficient capital investments. A competitive firm decides to
invest by comparing costs with overall impact on revenues. For example, if
GM is deciding whether to build a new production facility, it must consider
whether the market is ready to accept increased output at a profitable price,
or whether there will be offsetting output reductions from existing facilities.
If it miscalculates and the extra production drives prices below incremental
costs, then the plant will be unprofitable. No one would compensate GM for
the bad investment.
By contrast, the public utility- is guaranteed a positive rate of return on
its investment that quite typically exceeds the cost of capital. If the
investment is excessive and produces excess capacity, the utility still will be
entitled to receive an overall rate of return that is positive, provided that the
investment was prudently incurred. Further, the regulated firm typically is
allowed a positive rate of return on its capital assets, while it obtains only a
pass through of expenses. As a result, the regulated firm will typically
prefer more capital-intensive alternatives than an unregulated firm. The
literature on this proposition is large, well-documented, and reasonably free
of controversy.90
90. The basic thesis was developed in Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the
Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. EcON. REv. 1052 (1962). They noted:
[I]f the rate of return allowed by the regulatory agency is greater than the cost of capital
but is less than the rate of return that would be enjoyed by the firm were it free to
maximize profit without regulatory constraint, then the firm will substitute capital for
the other factor of production and operate at an output where cost is not minimized.
Id. at 1053. Justice Breyer once gave this example:
Michigan Electric Company would be delighted to borrow $10 million at 7 percent to
build Egyptian pyramids if the fair rate of return is 8 percent. If the regulator approves
[the utility's request], it will collect an additional $800,000 from its Michigan
customers, pay $700,000 to its bondholders, and keep the difference.
BREYER, supra note 2, at 49; see also KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE
EcONOMIc THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 19-22 (1991) (summarizing the Averch-Johnson
effect); H. Craig Petersen, An Empirical Test of Regulatory Effects, 6 BELL J. ECON. 111, 124
(1975) (finding empirical support for the Averch-Johnson hypotheses). For a survey of the
subsequent literature, see Roger Sherman, The Averch and Johnson Analysis of Public Utility
Regulation Twenty Years Later, 2 REv. INDUS. ORG. 178 (1985); and for a summary, see 2 KAHN,
supra note 73, at 47-94, especially at 49. Related recent literature includes Bernard S. Black &
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Choice Between Markets and Central Planning in Regulating the U.S.
Electricity Industry, 93 COLuM. L. REv. 1339, 1344-46 (1993), which explains how flaws in rate
regulation were exposed; Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of
Telecommunications Reform, 97 COLuM. L. REv. 835, 872 (1997), which applies Averch-Johnson
to account for "gold plating" and slowness of innovation in pre-divestiture telecommunications
industry; and Peter Navarro, The Simple Analytics of Performance-Based Ratemaking: A Guide
for the PBR Regulator, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 105, 119-23 (1996), which discusses the merits and
disadvantages of performance-based ratemaking versus traditional rate-based regulation.
While Sidak and Spulber do not discuss Averch-Johnson in Deregulatory Takings, Spulber
has discussed it elsewhere:
The Yale Law Journal
If regulatory agencies initiated all orders to construct additional
facilities, then the state, rather than the private utility, would be responsible
for excessive capital investments. But in most regulatory regimes a utility
basically decides for itself whether to build extra facilities. The utility
typically operates under an obligation to provide adequate service to its
customer base, including sufficient capacity to handle reasonably
anticipated breakdowns or temporary surges in demand. Yet the question of
specific compliance is usually up to the utility itself. State regulatory
regimes vary widely. Some states require that a utility, such as an electric
power company, obtain regulatory approval before constructing an
additional facility.9 In such regimes, however, it is typically contemplated
that the utility requests the additional facility, and the regulatory
commission then decides whether to approve. That is, ordinarily the process
does not work the other way around-with the commission ordering the
utility to build the facility whether it wishes to or not.92 Indeed, one of the
stated reasons for requiring government agency approval is to offset the
Averch-Johnson effece3 by ensuring that the utility does not make a greater
capital investment than necessary. In other states, the legislation simply
requires the utility to serve its customers adequately and leaves it largely up
to the utility to determine whether construction of additional facilities is
warranted.94 Even when regulatory approval of new investment is required,
the utility, which generally controls the necessary information, may be in a
position to present it selectively so as to make a stronger case for new
investment.
The classic analysis of Averch and Johnson and voluminous subsequent literature
shows that the imposition of a maximum allowed rate of return constraint causes
distortions in the capital-labor ratio of regulated firms. Under some conditions, the
profit-maximizing regulated firm employs more capital than the competitive firms as it
tries to increase its rate base and correspondingly lower its rate of return to meet the
constraint.
Daniel F. Spulber, Pricing and the Incentive To Invest in Pipelines After Great Lakes, 15 ENERGY
L.J. 377, 390 n.56 (1994); see also DANIEL F. SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 617-24
(1989) (discussing capital biases in the regulation of new entrants and incumbents); Daniel F.
Spulber & Robert A. Becker, Regulatory Lag and Deregulation with Imperfectly Adjustable
Capital, 6 J. ECON. DYNAMICS & CONTROL 137 (1983) (confirming the existence of Averch-
Johnson effects in advance of regulation, but not necessarily afterward, and indicating either
capital or labor biases in anticipation of deregulation).
91. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Regulatory Treatment of Mistakes in Retrospect: Canceled
Plants and Excess Capacity, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 497, 532 n.191 (1984) (listing states in which
regulatory approval is required in advance of construction).
92. See id. at 532.
93. See Pierce, supra note 91, at 533; supra note 90.
94. See, e.g., Kelley v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 316 N.W.2d 187, 190-92 (Mich. 1982)
(holding that a Michigan regulatory agency had no power to approve or disapprove a utility's
decision to build an additional facility); Public Serv. Co. v. State, 645 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1982)
(holding that the state regulatory commission could not base a refusal of a utility's request to issue
securities on a requirement that the utility demonstrate the necessity of the proposed construction
of an electric plant).
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Further, the regulated firm will have strong incentives to link adjacent
markets, particularly if it faces different demand elasticities in them. For
example, prior to the divestiture decree, AT&T had virtually no competitors
in owning local telephone monopolies and faced low demand elasticities.
By contrast, emergent competition in long distance gave it higher
elasticities there. The optimal strategy in such a case would be for AT&T to
cross-subsidize, charging higher rates in local markets where the decline in
customer demand would be low, in order to support lower rates in long-
distance markets. This would have increased the demand for capital
investment in the long-distance market while making it difficult for
competitive long-distance carriers who had no local monopoly to
compete." Thus, the Averch-Johnson effect may explain such phenomena
as the refusal of Otter Tail Power Company to "wheel" power for adjacent
small utilities, leading to an antitrust decree against it. 6 Even under price
regulation, it would be far more profitable for Otter Tail Power to build and
operate its own generation capacity to provide electricity to the smaller
utilities, thereby earning its rate of return on the new capital investment.
The first point, then, is that rate of return regulation gives firms
incentives to overinvest in capital with inefficient results. The second point
is that regulatory overseers are not always able to control this tendency to
overinvest, and sometimes they are not even committed to controlling it. In
addition to the expansive literature on regulatory capture, the antitrust case
law is filled with instances of decisions in which regulated firms faced
grossly ineffective oversight by their regulators, who often did little more
than rubber-stamp their requests.97
To be sure, a regulatory agency or the courts may make a subsequent
decision that a particular utility investment was prudent. For example, if an
electric utility decides to build a nuclear power plant that is never brought
into production as a result of changes in politics, demand, or the availability
of alternative energy sources, the utility may be able to pass development
costs on to consumers if these costs were "prudently incurred.""g
95. See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United
States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290 (John E. Kwoka & Lawrence J. White
eds., 2d. ed. 1994).
96. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 368-69 (1973). The Averch-
Johnson effect may explain anticompetitive refusals to deal, in that the utility naturally prefers to
apply its own capital to a market, receiving a positive rate of return, rather than cooperate with
another firm in using the latter's capital. For example, by refusing to "wheel" power at wholesale,
the utility may be able to take over a small adjacent utility and include that utility's delivery
network into its own rate base. See 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 772b, 787c
(rev. ed. 1996).
97. See, e.g., 2 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 96, 1 226 (noting a lack of oversight by
state and local regulatory agencies); 2A id. 242-43 (noting a lack of oversight by federal
agencies).
98. Consider the Court's statement in Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989):
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Importantly, however, to say that an investment was prudent when made is
to say that it was risk-justified, not that it was risk-free, and if the risk for a
certain class of investments is positive, at least some investments in that
class will likely fail.
Participants in competitive markets do not enjoy a "prudent investor"
rule providing compensation for failure. If Ford gathers all cost-justified
information and makes an ex ante calculation that an additional production
plant for its Taurus line is warranted, then it has acted prudently. But the
automobile market or the economy may still take an unforeseen turn,
rendering the investment unprofitable, and no one will be required to
compensate Ford for its bad luck. Thus, in the absence of an explicit
regulatory contract promising compensation, the mere fact that a regulatory
investment is "prudent" at the time it was made is not sufficient to justify a
subsequent compensation award when the investment decision was initiated
by the utility itself.99
Another possible rationale for requiring compensation for utilities' own
improvident investments is that, while utilities initiate most investment
decisions themselves, the government is responsible for the cost-of-service
ratemaking regime that creates the incentive to overinvest in the first place.
Indeed, the state's adoption of a particular regulatory approach is ultimately
responsible not only for the incentives that the approach creates but also for
the lack of effective regulatory review. So suppose a public utility operates
in an environment in which its managers know that they can earn more for
their shareholders by making excessive investments in specialized and
durable productive assets.' Suppose further that it has been the utility
managers' experience that the agency will not adequately scrutinize the
need for new facilities as carefully as it should and will probably grant the
utility what it wishes.
Under the prudent investment rule, the utility is compensated for all prudent
investments at their actual cost when made (their "historical" cost), irrespective of
whether individual investments are deemed necessary or beneficial in hindsight. The
utilities incur fewer risks, but are limited to a standard rate of return on the actual
amount of money reasonably invested.
Id. at 309; see also Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 55 Pa. P.U.C.
478, 486 (1982) (permitting cost recovery, but not return, on the development of the subsequently
abandoned Three Mile Island nuclear plant); Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Order No.
888, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540, 21,628-630 (1996) (ruling that stranded costs may be recovered only if
"legitimate, prudent and verifiable"). See generally A. Lawrence Kolbe & William B. Tye, It
Ain't in There: The Cost of Capital Does Not Compensate for Stranded-Cost Risk, PUB. UTIL.
FORT., May 15, 1995, at 26; Stephen F. Williams, Deregulatory Takings and Breach of the
Regulatory Contract: A Comment, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1000, 1003-04 (1996) (noting the
difficulties of measuring product costs).
99. Cf. Duquesne Light Co., 488 U.S. at 301-02 (holding that the Fifth Amendment does not
require compensation for all prudently incurred public utility investments).
100. See sources cited supra note 90.
[Vol. 108: 801
Deregulatory Takings
Sidak and Spulber's apparent answer is that the fact that the investment
was initially approved already establishes that it was prudent.' But, as
noted previously, the unregulated market does not compensate even for
"prudent" investments that subsequently become worthless. To make the
argument for compensation, one must show not merely that the investment
was "prudent" but also that it was not part of the investor's reasonable,
investment-backed expectations that the government would later open the
regulated market to increased competition. Significantly, the normal
consequence of deregulation is not that the sovereign forcibly closes down
a plant or forces the uncompensated transfer of title. Rather, the
government typically opens the market to more entry or permits service
providers from a wider geographic range to compete for a particular area's
business.
In such a setting, where the utility itself is the real initiator of new
investment; where the many defects of cost-of-service ratemaking have
been a standard if not completely uncontroversial part of the literature for
well over three decades;" 2 where a great deal of other literature has
emphasized the great efficiency gains that can flow from regimes that
emphasize competition for the market as an alternative to regulated
monopoly;0 3 where "deregulation" has been part of the general
government agenda for two decades;"° and where many technological
changes have rendered increased competition both feasible and
economically preferable, the utility can hardly claim a reasonable
expectation that increased competition would not be encouraged in the
future.
Further, given the strong element of utility initiative in new investment,
a regime that provides compensation for investments subsequently rendered
unprofitable by increased competition has precisely the same perverse
effect here as it does in the general case of unregulated industries. It
exacerbates the incentives that regulated firms already have to overinvest
101. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 487 ("The regulator already passed on the
prudency of those investments before the utility made them and was allowed to include them in its
regulated capital account.").
102. The original Averch & Johnson article was published in 1962. See supra note 90.
103. See, e.g., WILLiAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982); Elizabeth E. Bailey & John C. Panzar, The Contestability of
Airline Markets During the Transition to Deregulation, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 125 (1981);
Richard Beilock & James Freeman, The Effect on Rate Levels and Structures of Removing Entry
and Rate Controls on Motor Carriers, 21 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL'Y 167 (1987); Joseph F.
Brodley, Antitrust Policy Under Deregulation: Airline Mergers and the Theory of Contestable
Markets, 61 B.U. L. REv. 823 (1981); Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON.
55 (1968); David R. Graham et al., Efficiency and Competition in the Airline Industry, 14 BELL J.
EcON. 118 (1983); John S. Ying, The Inefficiency of Regulating a Competitive Industry:
Productivity Gains in Trucking Following Reform, 72 REV. ECON. & STAT. 191 (1990).
104. For example, the initial trucking and airline deregulation occurred in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.
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by guaranteeing them a profitable exit if the environment later becomes
more competitive.
IV. CHANGES IN TECHNOLOGY VS. CHANGES IN REGULATORY POLICY
In competitive markets, productive assets often become worthless
because consumer tastes change or new technology makes old investments
obsolete. No one is entitled to compensation for such losses. According to
Sidak and Spulber, the thing that distinguishes the regulatory relationship
from ordinary business investments is that when obsolescence occurs, it is
often the result of a government policy change rather than a change in
consumer preference or technology.1 5 Thus, Sidak and Spulber would limit
compensation to changes that are brought about by shifts in government
regulatory policy. They would not provide compensation for stranded costs
brought about simply by changes in technology.0 6
Discussions of obsolescence in competitive markets generally involve
examinations of the relative benefits and costs associated with switching.
At any given time, the market is full of "obsolete" technology. Airlines fly
ancient aircraft; trucking companies continue to use trucks that do not
incorporate all of the economy, convenience, or safety features of the latest
models; farmers continue to use old tractors; businesses continue to use
computers with pre-Pentium chips or old versions of Microsoft Windows.
Firms do this not because of regulatory constraints or ideological opposition
to innovation, but simply because switching costs are too high in relation to
the gains to be obtained. For example, trucks are ordinarily driven until they
wear out-perhaps at 200,000 miles-even though they may be technically
"obsolete" after the first year because they no longer incorporate all the
latest features. In some cases, firms buy assets and use them until they wear
out, notwithstanding that they are no longer state-of-the-art. In other cases,
where obsolescence has a more substantial impact on performance or other
determinants of profitability, the firm abandons obsolete assets earlier.
Unfortunately, regulated firms operate under more complex incentives
because they ordinarily get their rate of return on both the obsolete assets
and the new ones. As a result they may continue to use outdated facilities
long after a "similarly situated" competitive firm would have abandoned
them.
Sidak and Spulber's conclusion that compensation is due for changes in
government policy but not for changes in technology assumes considerably
more discreteness about these two causes of obsolescence than reality
105. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 19-25.
106. See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 462-63 (noting that there is properly no
compensation for a decrease in demand resulting from exogenous market factors not caused by
changes in government policy).
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warrants." 7 Granted, much of the deregulation movement has resulted from
developments in economic and regulatory theory that emphasize the
robustness of markets and the many costs and inefficiencies of agency
regulation. But to a very large extent, deregulation has also been facilitated
by developments in technology itself. That is, the government has merely
responded to changes in available technology by changing the regulatory
environment.
One case in point is the rise of competition in long-distance
communications.0 8 The pre-1970s regime, in which AT&T had a top-to-
bottom monopoly on the telecommunications system, developed at a time
when AT&T's long lines divisions really were made up of "long lines" -
that is, long-distance connections were made along hard-wired circuits that
traveled among local systems, making the national (and world) telephone
systems a kind of macro-image of the local system. Long-distance
competition with firms such as MCI or Sprint would have required the
construction of additional sets of lines and switching devices that very
likely exceeded the capabilities of the technology. What made long-distance
competition feasible was the development of wireless communications
systems, as well as switching and access technologies that enabled multiple
providers' to access local systems and calls to be recorded and billed
accordingly.
The same is largely true of the interconnection requirements mandated
by the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 9 for which Sidak and Spulber
would apparently require compensation."0 In large part, interconnection to
the local loop is designed simply to permit firms to take advantage of
switching (and, in some cases, wireless technologies) that became available
long after the original telephone monopoly was created. Likewise, in the
electric power industry many plants have been rendered obsolete not by
changes in government policy, but by the development of lower-cost
107. Cf. SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 258-59, 423 (contrasting the technological
obsolescence of the streetcar industry with the regulation enforced on electric utilities and local
exchange telecommunications).
108. For a more complete account of this history, see KELLOGG ET AL., supra note 3, at 23-
39; MEYER ET AL., supra note 3, at 1-68, 111-201; and RICHARD H.K. ViETOR, CONTRIVED
COMPETITION: REGULATION AND DEREGULATION IN AMERICA 166-233 (1994).
109. These provisions impose broad duties on incumbent telecommunications providers to
share their facilities by providing interconnection. The first provides, "Each telecommunications
carrier has the duty (1) to interconnect directly or indirectly with the facilities and equipment of
other telecommunications carriers; and (2) not to install network features, functions, or
capabilities that do not comply with the guidelines and standards established .... 47 U.S.C.A.
§ 251(a) (West Supp. 1998). The second provision creates a "duty to provide, to any requesting
telecommunications carrier for the provision of a telecommunications service, nondiscriminatory
access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms
and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory .. " 47 U.S.C.A. § 251(c)(3)
(West Supp. 1998). See generally 3A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 96, 785 (describing
the statutory duties of local exchange carriers); HUBER ET AL., supra note 4, at § 1.1.2b (same).
110. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 307-42.
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alternatives for constructing generation plants that make them cheaper to
build and operate. Wheeling of power then becomes harmful to an
incumbent with older, higher-cost units because it permits entry into the
market by lower-cost production facilities."'
One way to determine -whether changes in technology or changes in
policy "caused" the obsolescence of certain hardware is to consider what a
business firm that owned the entire system would have done. Suppose that
General Motors (GM) owns many discrete electric generation facilities
servicing its numerous manufacturing plants around the world. Some of
these generation facilities are efficient, others obsolete and high-cost. Then
suppose technology develops that permits GM to transmit power over long
distances at low cost, thus enabling it to utilize its least costly generation
facilities. If GM would make the switch under such circumstances, it would
be because of a recognition that the new technology is so far superior to the
old one that premature retirement is justified. In that case, a government
decision mandating the switch would do no more than recognize what
technology has already determined, and no compensation would be due.
This is essentially what has happened in the market for electric power
during the last generation.' Yet the rule advocated by Sidak and Spulber
would require compensation in such circumstances. 13
In sum, one would expect a competitive firm to replace obsolete
technology when it becomes cost-effective to do so. This often occurs
before such technology has worn out, but no one compensates the firm for
the unamortized costs of useful but obsolete machinery that must be retired.
A rational firm might even invest in a technology (such as computers) that
it foresees will become obsolete before it wears out if the firm anticipates
that the gains from doing so will exceed the costs. Significantly, one would
expect the regulatory agency overseeing such firms to do essentially the
same thing. Agencies and the firms that they regulate presumably read the
same trade literature and anticipate roughly the same developments.
I 11. See, e.g., Samir F. Barakat & Gregory B. Enholm, Key Considerations for Reinventing
Electric Utility Regulation, in REINVENTING ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION 7, 7 (Gregory B.
Enholn & J. Robert Malko eds., 1995) (noting the availability of lower-cost electric power from
smaller power plants); Wise, supra note 5, at 267-68 (same).
112. See, e.g., Michael Evan Stem & Margaret M. Mlynczak Stem, A Critical Oveniew of
the Economic and Environmental Consequences of the Deregulation of the U.S. Electric Power
Industry, 4 ENvTL. L. 79, 88-90 (1997) (describing how investor-backed entrepreneurs formed
independent power producers that had the capability to send their product over the nationwide
transmission system owned by traditional utilities).
113. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 257-62 (requiring recovery of the portion of
costs attributable to the regulatory action).
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V. COMPENSATION FOR DIMINISHED EXPECTATIONS: FROM WHAT POINT
SHOULD COMPENSATION BE MEASURED?
As noted previously, the debate over compensation for stranded costs in
some industries, such as electric power, has been significantly muted by the
fact that presumably "stranded" facilities have ended up fetching a
significantly higher price than initially predicted. Indeed, to the extent the
appropriate compensation measure is the book value of the stranded
facilities, compensation may be zero because virtually all of the sales have
taken place at prices in excess of book value."4
Nonetheless, Sidak and Spulber point out that when deregulatory
regimes were put into place, the stock of many electric utilities declined
precipitously almost immediately, reflecting shareholder expectations about
declining value.'15 They argue that this anticipatory measure, not the
measure produced by the impact on profits measured ex post or as affected
by subsequent events, ought to determine the amount of compensation."6
As they note, in an efficient market the loss of value imposed by
deregulation is reflected immediately in the stock price and this immediate
loss of value, not some subsequently determined measure of net value, is
the true loss. 7 To the extent that the values of higher-than-anticipated sale
prices are not discounted in the market already, they do not reflect the value
of the taking at the time it occurs, but only of developments that occur
thereafter.
The other side of the coin, however, is that the Supreme Court has
always applied after-the-fact, or backward-looking, measures of
compensation in takings cases. Such measures therefore must be regarded
as part of anyone's investment-backed expectations in areas of enterprise
that are subject to subsequent assertions of the eminent domain power. To
give the classic example, suppose that the city of Detroit uses its eminent
114. See Power Plant Sales Raise Questions About Stranded Costs, Consumers' Bills, supra
note 15.
115. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 439 (giving examples).
116. See id. The authors criticize the Supreme Court's holding in Pennell v. City of San Jose,
485 U.S. 1 (1988), as creating a "ripeness" rule that would refuse to grant compensation merely
on the passage of a rent control statute. SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 439. The Court noted
that at the time of the challenge the city actually had not yet applied the statute so as to reduce a
tenant's rent. But the Pennell case is not relevant to Sidak and Spulber's analysis. Proper
application of the ordinance in Pennell should lead to the result that no taking would ever occur;
that is, if the federal constitutional minimum for rent control is a reasonable rate of return on
historical cost, and rent control board administrative judges are so instructed, they could apply the
San Jose ordinance in such a fashion that no unconstitutional taking ever occurred. The point of
the Supreme Court's analysis was that the mere fact that a rent control ordinance made a taking in
a particular case conceivable (by considering tenant hardship and possibly assessing a rent lower
than the constitutional minimum) did not make the ordinance ripe for a facial challenge; rather,
landlords would have to make "as applied" challenges to particular instances in which the official
actually awarded a rental rate below the constitutional minimum.
117. See SIDAK & SPULBBR, supra note 7, at 15.
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domain power to take a residential subdivision for subsequent resale to GM
for a new production facility.' The reason for using the eminent domain
power in the first place is to obtain the property at its "residential value,"
which equals its market value in a world in which GM had not intended to
make the acquisition. Once GM has announced that it wishes to purchase
the property by voluntary transactions, the price will rise, perhaps
dramatically, and talented holdouts will be able to demand exorbitantly
high prices. But in the eminent domain proceeding, compensation will be
based on the testimony of appraisers and real estate brokers who will testify
about past transactions that, of course, were made when GM's entry into
the market was not contemplated." 9 In sum, the city of Detroit is able to
facilitate GM's entry into the Detroit economy by forcing the property
owners to accept as compensation the amount of money they would receive
in a world in which GM was not entering the market, rather than the actual
world in which its entry is contemplated. As a result, the property owners
will be seriously undercompensated. But "just compensation" is almost
always measured by backward-looking measures of this type. Indeed, an
important rationale for eminent domain as an alternative to voluntary
exchange is to prevent landowners from insisting that the government pay
all that it is willing to pay; rather, the government must pay only what some
alternative purchaser would have paid in a market in which the eminent
domain power was not being asserted.
Thus, although Sidak and Spulber may be right that utilities are
receiving less compensation than an efficient market might provide them, in
reality, after-the-fact measures provide them with all the compensation to
which they are constitutionally entitled, and the rule is clear enough that an
investor could not reasonably expect more.
Further, to the extent that the Sidak and Spulber duty to compensate
utilities for stranded costs is based on contract, there is a duty to mitigate,
and mitigation is-whether correctly or not-measured after the fact. That
is, if I improperly vacate my apartment today and my landlord has a duty to
mitigate, compensation for breach of the lease agreement will be based on
the difference between the amount of rent I was paying and the amount that
the new tenant actually ends up paying, plus other costs and expenses. The
Sidak and Spulber approach would provide compensation based on the
amount of rent that the landlord reasonably could have expected for the
property at the time the breach occurred. Once again, if the duty to
compensate is driven by the investor's reasonable expectations, and these
are determined by the state of the law, then any reduction in injury caused
118. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981)
(analyzing precisely this case).




by actual sales of stranded facilities must be considered in calculating
compensation.
Finally, the Sidak and Spulber argument for compensation based on
immediately experienced lost shareholder value seems to undermine their
case for compensation altogether. If shareholders had a reasonable
investment-backed expectation that compensation for stranded costs would
be paid, then why would shareholder value decline at all? For example,
Sidak and Spulber note that when the California Public Utilities
Commission announced that it would begin proceedings that would lead to
the introduction of retail wheeling in that state, three major utilities
experienced twenty percent declines in share prices almost overnight.120 The
anticipation that led to the decline was that importing power from remote
sources would reduce the demand for local power, thus leaving local
producers with excess capacity and stranding superfluous facilities.
If the shareholders' reasonable expectation was that they would be
perfectly compensated for these losses, however, then shareholder price
should not have declined at all. If the existence of the regulatory contract
and the correlative duty to compensate is clear, an informed investor would
have known that the cost of deregulation must be borne by the government.
The decline in shareholder value that actually occurred indicates that
shareholders were quite well-informed about the extent of the government's
obligation to compensate. There was none.
VI. CONCLUSION
Sidak and Spulber make a prolonged and ingenious argument for
transferring more of the costs of deregulation away from investors and
toward utility customers or taxpayers. However, their central contention
falls short. Their case for compensation rests mainly on the premise of a
regulatory "contract" with the government that promises compensation for
stranded costs. But such contracts are far less common in the twentieth
century than they were before the Civil War, when much of regulation took
the form of price or output controls stipulated in corporate charters. Under
modem statutory forms of regulation, which are often applied to assets
already in place at the time regulation is imposed, the argument for a
regulatory contract is much more difficult to sustain-particularly when
most investment decisions are at the regulated firm's own initiative.
The legal rules specifying when such contracts exist are so well-
established and clear that the assumption of such a contract cannot typically
be said to be a part of the investor's reasonable, investment-backed
expectations. In that case, compensating utilities for investments made at
120. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 7, at 439.
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their own initiative-even if they were "prudent" when made-is
counterproductive and has perverse results. It exacerbates even further the
problem of chronic overinvestment by rate-regulated firms. To the extent
that utilities are overcompensated in light of the risk that they actually
assumed, the result may also be to give entrenched firms a significant
advantage over new entrants, who cannot look forward to such largesse
from the state.
In most circumstances, the utility investor's investment-backed
expectations are not all that different from the expectations of the investor
in an ordinary enterprise, who can almost never expect compensation for
obsolescence and only rarely for changes in government policy. In this case
the change in policy is most typically the replacement of monopoly with
some kind of competitive regime. Given that society has been debating the
large costs and relatively small benefits of regulation for more than twenty-
five years, one can hardly argue that perpetual freedom from competition
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Every July and August, three dozen of the nation's most promising
young lawyers begin service as law clerks to the Justices of the United
States Supreme Court. Being a Supreme Court clerk is the most prestigious
job to which a law school graduate can aspire. Those selected spend a year
observing and participating in the decisionmaking processes of our nation's
highest court, an experience most lawyers can only dream of. A Supreme
Court clerkship is a ticket to the best jobs in the legal profession and in
academia. It is a source of pride for the rest of the lawyer's career.
Until the publication of Closed Chambers' last year, it was well
understood that whatever a clerk learned about case deliberations during his
term of service would never be disclosed outside the Court. This was made
clear to the new clerks during conversations with the Justices, and it was
part of the institutional ethos-the bedrock of assumptions shared by those
working within the Court. During the 1988 Term, it was embodied in a
written Code of Conduct for Supreme Court Law Clerks which provides:
"A law clerk should never disclose to any person any confidential
t Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Chock-full of disclosures: I
know many of the people described in this book, including the author, who clerked for one of my
colleagues a decade ago. I clerked for Justice (then Judge) Kennedy, who is ill-treated in the book,
and one of Justice Kennedy's clerks, who is portrayed as a cross between Don Corleone and
Freddie Krueger, clerked for me prior to his tenure at the Supreme Court. I also clerked for Chief
Justice Burger, who is briefly though brutally savaged, and I know and respect Chief Justice
Rehnquist, several of the Associate Justices, and a number of their former clerks who are
mentioned unfavorably.
I am grateful for the valuable comments of a number of people, particularly Professor Gerard
Lynch of Columbia Law School; Professor Lynch and I clerked together at the Court, he for
Justice Brennan. And a special thanks to my law clerk Bill Burek, who has spent countless hours
on this project and has made a substantial number of useful comments and edits.
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